Negotiation is extremely common in legal settings. In the criminal context, most cases are resolved through the plea bargaining process rather than through trials. Similarly, many more civil disputes are resolved by private settlement than go to trial. Transactional lawyers spend much of their time negotiating deals and contracts. In practice, lawyers will negotiate with opposing parties and their counsel, with insurers, with regulators, and with their own clients. Psychologists have studied negotiation in a variety of contexts, including negotiation as it occurs in the legal system. Research indicates that negotiation outcomes may be influenced by such factors as cognitive heuristics and biases, social perceptions, emotions, social influence, and the legal background of the negotiators.
Basic negotiation theory holds that negotiation outcomes are a function of the negotiator’s reservation price, or bottom line. That is, negotiators will identify a point at which they would prefer to walk away from the negotiation without an agreement rather than accept terms that fall below that point. Where negotiators set this reservation price along a continuum of possible agreements is affected by their expectations about the outcomes that would likely result in the absence of a negotiated agreement. So, for example, a civil plaintiff’s reservation point (i.e., the lowest amount for which he or she would settle) is informed by his or her prediction about what would happen if the case was decided at trial. Similarly, a party negotiating a sales agreement on behalf of a buyer sets his or her reservation price (e.g., the highest price he or she would pay) in light of the availability and value of a possible agreement with an alternative contracting partner. Negotiators with more attractive predicted alternatives are likely to have higher reservation prices and to reach more favorable agree-ments. Negotiators have also been shown to be influenced by their aspirations, or goals, for the negotiation, with negotiators who set higher goals achieving more favorable agreements. At the same time, however, high reservation prices and aspirations have both been shown to lead to a higher likelihood of impasse (i.e., failure to reach a negotiated agreement) and to a decreased level of satisfaction with the same objective outcomes.
但是,在这个一般框架内,很明显,谈判者受许多其他因素的影响。Going beyond expected value theory, in which negotiation decisions are determined by a comparison of the expected value of forgoing a negotiated agreement with the expected value of the proposed agreement, psychological research demonstrates that negotiation decision making is also affected by negotiators’ construal of and judgments about the other party or parties, the context, and themselves.
Heuristics and Biases in Legal Negotiation
与其他谈判者一样,法律谈判者可能会受到心理启发式或偏见的决策。例如,争端不同方面的法律谈判者倾向于对案件的优点进行有偏见的评估,从而使他们的评估有利于他们的一方,高估了他们在审判中盛行的可能性,并且更有可能相信公平的结果是之一这有利于他们的身边。在某种程度上,这是因为那些仅接触到争议特定方面的信息的人往往是乐观地过度自信的,也就是说,在他们对他们的可能性前的预言中更加自信,更准确比从双方获得信息的人会占上风。同样,当他们寻求其他信息时,谈判者以符合已经存在的观点一致的方式来表达确认性偏见。In addition, however, even when they have access to the same objective facts, negotiators often interpret those facts and make judgments about them in ways that are consistent with their own (or their clients’) interests—a manifestation of the self-serving (or egocentric) bias.
谈判者也可能受到锚的影响。锚定和调整是指可用值为判断提供起点(或“锚”)的现象;然后,调整远离锚点,但是这些调整通常不足。在法律背景下,已证明锚来通过锚定谈判者对适当的和解金额的评估来影响民事案件的解决决策。例如,在媒体中报告的可观判决的可用性可能会锚定谈判者对案件潜在和解价值的看法。此外,已证明在和解谈判中提出的第一个要约会影响最终的谈判协议(开放要约越高,最终解决方案越高。同样,研究发现,当最终报价之前,争议者更有可能同意特定的最终解决金额,而与在开放报价之前的开放报价更为极端的开放报价之前,该报价与最终报价仅略有不同提供。由于初始提供的锚定期望对适当的和解金额的期望,因此根据这些期望来衡量任何特许权的价值。
此外,实验研究表明,谈判者在产生并考虑谈判结果的选择时可能会受到对比和妥协影响的影响。当添加附加选项相似但不如初始选项之一时,对初始集合中的选项的评估相对于彼此的评估不同时,就会发生对比效果,从而使该初始选项看起来相对更具吸引力。例如,涉及一块财产争议的争议者可能会考虑出售财产并将收益与另一方分配,或者允许另一方保留财产以换取特定的金钱。例如,当引入第三个选择时,例如允许另一方保留财产以换取相同的金钱,但会随着时间的推移而付费 - 这种选择类似但不如一次涉及一次性付款的选项,更多的人倾向于选择一次性付款选项,而在没有其他选项的情况下,更少倾向于出售财产和分割收益。
Compromise effects, on the other hand, occur when an extreme option is introduced into the set of options under consideration. The introduction of an extreme value alters the range of options that are in the middle of the choice set. Because negotiators are more likely to choose an option when it appears to be a moderate choice, this shift in range tends to increase the attractiveness of a choice that would have appeared extreme in the smaller set, but appears moderate in the presence of the additional, more extreme, option. For example, negotiators are more likely to enter into a land purchase contract when the property at issue is considered among a set of alternative properties that make it appear to be a compromise, or moderate, option. Thus, while it is useful for legal negotiators to actively generate creative options for agreement, it is also useful for them to attend to the ways in which additional options affect their evaluation of existing alternatives.
最后,法律谈判者还受到谈判的影响。前景理论表明,谈判者将提出的结果与现状进行比较。当谈判者的选择被认为是收益时,谈判者可能会以一种冒险的方式行事,因此,普通诉讼中的民事原告可能更倾向于解决。相反,当谈判者的选择被视为损失时,谈判者可能以寻求风险的方式行事 - 因此,典型的民事被告可能更倾向于赌博。
法律谈判中的社会因素
法律环境中的谈判也受到各种社会和互动因素的影响。例如,法律谈判受到谈判者对公平性的看法的影响。谈判者都关注谈判结果的分配公平性以及谈判过程本身的程序和互动公平性。重要的是,谈判者拒绝同意不符合其实质性公平的实质性结果。同样,公平的人际交往可以减少自我服务的偏见,减少僵局的可能性,并增加对实质性结果的满意度。
社会因素还可以影响拟议定居点的公平性。例如,否则被认为是公平的选项似乎不太明显,因此在谈判中另一端提出的时,这一现象被称为反应性贬值。同样,双方的谈判者倾向于重视他们所做的特许权(因此被视为损失)比对另一侧做出的优惠(因此被视为收益)更高。因此,这种“让步厌恶”影响了对当事方提供的相对优惠和提议的相对公平性的看法。
In some instances, legal negotiators may also be influenced by a need to restore or maintain a sense of equity between the parties or to achieve vindication. Thus, they may reject compromises that seem inequitable, even when accepting them would be economically rational. Negotiators may also seek out ways to achieve a sense of equity or the acknowledgment of a harm. Thus, for example, apologies have been shown to influence legal settlement decision making. Research has shown that when a wrongdoer apologizes (particularly if the apology accepts responsibility for having caused harm), the injured party may make more favorable attributions about the opposing party and the incident, be less likely to seek legal counsel for assistance in pursuing a claim, set lower aspirations, find lower settlement values to be fair, be less likely to desire punishment, and be more likely to accept an offer of settlement than when the wrongdoer does not apologize.
法律谈判的影响
法律谈判的学者也借鉴了影响力和说服力的心理学,以更好地了解他们对谈判策略的理解。特别是,法律谈判者可能会遵守互惠的原则,而这是最大的谈判的来回让步。互惠的规范认为,当一个谈判者对另一个谈判者做出让步时,另一个谈判者必须以实物做出回应。因此,法律谈判代表可以通过提供自己的特许权来从对方引起特许权。此外,法律谈判代表可能会提出可能被拒绝的极端需求,其次是更温和的请求 - 请求的适量性可能被视为特许权,因此可能会引起互惠的特许权。在心理学中,这被称为“拒绝 - 重度”策略。法律谈判者还可以援引权威,稀缺,社会证明或熟悉和喜欢作为谈判中社会影响的策略。
法律谈判和情感
法律纠纷可能涉及激烈的情绪,例如愤怒,而这种情绪在谈判中起着核心作用。经历积极情绪的谈判者倾向于做出更多的让步,并更有可能参与解决问题的行为。相反,经历负面情绪的谈判者往往更有可能使用艰苦的策略,而产生联合收益的可能性较小。
在法律背景下探索的一种特定情绪是遗憾在法律谈判中的作用。研究发现,争议者可能更喜欢在法律案件中达成协议的定居点,而不是接受审判,部分原因是他们希望最大程度地减少他们在决定后会经历的遗憾。选择定居的争议者无法知道如果审判进行审判的结果将是什么,因此能够避免遗憾的是,遗憾的是,他们会出现审判会带来更好的结果的知识。相比之下,选择参加审判的争议者最终将不仅了解审判结果,而且还要了解他们拒绝的任何和解要约。因此,他们可能会感到遗憾的是,他们知道自己可以通过解决方案获得更好的结果 - 重新将他们宁愿避免。
Agents/Lawyers in Legal Negotiation
许多法律谈判的独特特征之一是,主要政党(法律客户)通常以律师为代理人代表。作为代理商,律师可能以与客户的不同方式进行和解谈判。例如,作为非机构,律师可以更偏离争议的情绪。同样,选择并训练律师以高度分析。此外,鉴于他们担任法律顾问的角色,律师可能比客户更熟悉和调整法律规则。这些差异使律师在处理法律纠纷方面有一些优势。例如,律师可能能够避免当各方太情绪化而无法互相谈判时可能导致的僵局。但是,这些差异也使律师在代表客户进行谈判方面面临一些挑战。例如,律师可能需要特别关注客户的非法律心理,情感和社会利益,以代表他们有效地谈判。
参考:
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- Loewenstein, G., Issacharoff, S., Camerer, C., & Babcock, L. (1993). Self-serving assessments of fairness and pretrial bargaining. Journal of Legal Studies, 22, 135-159.
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